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Declining trust in news media has often been recognized as one of 
the major challenges facing modern journalism with potentially 
detrimental consequences for democratic processes. In this 
article, we examine the predictive potential of cultural-political 
and performance factors on public trust in news media in the 
context of a young democracy. Specifically, we have analyzed to 
what extent citizens’ populist attitudes and perceptions of 
journalistic roles relate to the levels of media trust using data from 
an online survey of Serbian respondents (N = 200). The findings 
showed that support for populism did not significantly predict 
trust in news media in general after controlling for relevant 
factors, most importantly political trust. However, populist 
attitudes were found to be related to the amount of trust citizens 
have in distinct types of news media –i.e., those who support 
populism exhibited less trust in public broadcasters than in online 
news outlets. The analyses also revealed that the more Serbian 
citizens perceived news media as being successful at performing 
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1. Introduction 
Many democratic countries across the world have experienced a significant decline of public 
trust in news media in recent decades (Hanitzsch, Van Dalen & Steindl, 2018). Consequently, 
a great deal of research effort has been directed towards understanding the causes of such 
decline (for an overview, see McLeod, Wise & Perryman, 2017). In line with cultural and 
performance theories regarding institutional trust, previous studies have commonly analyzed 
media trust as a function of audience characteristics and/or media performance (Hanitzsch et 
al., 2018; Hopmann, Shehata & Strömbäck, 2015; Ladd, 2012; Pjesivac, 2017). 
Declining media trust is particularly alarming for young democracies in which the news 
media are expected to perform decisive roles in promoting democracy by boosting political 
accountability and empowering people to demand the development of more inclusive social 
institutions (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012). To gain a better understanding of how trust can be 
strengthened in such a context, this study was set to analyze the sources of public trust in 
news media in Serbia, a young democracy with communist and authoritarian heritage, 
currently moving toward joining the European Union (EU). After a long experience with non-
democratic regimes, public trust in social institutions in Serbia –much like in other East 
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media, which, for decades, were perceived as mouthpieces for oppressive regimes. As a result, 
we argue that media trust in countries like Serbia is highly sensitive to the extent to which the 
citizens perceive that the news media are departing from their old ways and assuming the 
functions and identity better aligned with citizens’ democratic expectations. We identified 
populist attitudes and perceptions of the journalistic role performance as relevant audience 
and media factors of media trust, which can capture the dynamics described in this 
theoretical expectation. 
From a populist perspective, society is fundamentally divided into two antagonistic 
groups: “the pure people” and “the corrupt elite” (Mudde, 2004). Studies have recently started 
to investigate how the news media fit in such a binary worldview (Fawzi, 2019; Flew, 2019). 
This is a particularly relevant question in countries like Serbia, in which the independence of 
the media has frequently been disputed (Pjesivac, Spasovska & Imre, 2017). 
The notion of journalistic roles refers to the basic functions the news media are supposed 
to carry out in a democratic society–such as providing relevant political information to the 
citizens and monitoring government activities (Hanitzsch & Vos, 2018). In new democracies, 
like Serbia, the news media have a long history of serving the political elite rather than 
citizens. Therefore, public perceptions of the effective performance of normative citizen-
oriented journalistic roles can indicate how successfully the media have adapted to the new 
democratic conditions and how the media are meeting citizens’ demands. 
With this article we hope to contribute to the current discussion on media trust in the 
following ways. As populism is becoming an increasingly prominent aspect of political 
cultures around the world, we emphasized the importance of considering how the essential 
elements of populist worldview (i.e., people-centrism and anti-elitism) could affect trust in 
news media. We also suggested the importance of studying the performance factors of media 
trust in a more comprehensive manner, by examining various functions citizens expect media 
to perform. Finally, our study provided insight into the origins of media trust in a young 
democracy, which is still a relatively understudied context compared to established 
democracies. 
2. Theoretical framework 
2.1. The media environment and public perceptions of the news media in Serbia 
After the overthrow of the authoritarian regime of Slobodan Milošević in 2000, Serbia entered 
a long and turbulent process of democratic reforms, intending to harmonize the country’s 
legal and wider institutional framework with the EU standards1. This process also included 
the reform of the media sector. The reform focused on deregulation and privatization of 
previously state-owned media as well as the transformation of the state-run television into a 
public service broadcaster (Veljanovski, 2014). In addition, the Serbian news media have 
received a considerable amount of foreign financial assistance since the late 1990s. This aid 
was intended to help increase professionalism and independence of the news media (Rupar, 
Němcová Tejkalová, Láb & Seizova, 2019). 
However, these measures failed to significantly improve the conditions in the Serbian 
media environment. Today, the media market is oversaturated with 2,248 registered media 
outlets for a population of roughly seven million (IREX, 2019). The fact that the ownership 
structure and the sources of financing lack transparency inevitably leaves the media 
vulnerable to financial pressures. The quality of news contents is frequently disputed due to 
a widespread tabloidization and fake news as well as unbalanced coverage which not only 
favors the ruling coalition but also demonizes political opponents and critical citizens. 
 
1 Serbia currently holds the status of a “flawed democracy” according to The Economist Intelligence Unit (see 
https://www.eiu.com/topic/democracy-index); Freedom House classifies Serbia as a “transitioning or hybrid regime” 
(see https://freedomhouse.org/country/serbia/nations-transit/2020). 
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Journalists in Serbia are also subjected to frequent harassment from high political officials, 
who often resort to extremely hostile rhetoric to criticize the media (Freedom House, 2016; 
Rupar et al., 2019). The extent to which the independent and investigative news outlets 
experience legal pressure and smear campaigns became particularly severe under the 
government of the Serbian Progressive Party and the current president, Aleksandar Vučić2. 
Under such circumstances, a substantial gap has emerged between the public’s 
normative expectations from the media and dramatically negative evaluations of the actual 
media performance. One of the key normative expectations is related to increasing the 
media’s independence from political interferences. Calls for the government to remove 
restrictions on the freedom of the press and to protect the independence of media were 
important public demands, both during the 1990s protests against the Milošević’s regime and 
during the recent waves of anti-government protests started in 2018 (IREX, 2019; Rupar et al., 
2019). A recent study has found that Serbian citizens perceive that newspersons, when making 
professional decisions, commonly engage in corruptive practices, i.e., yielding to the demands 
from the media owners or other external political and economic sources of power (Pjesivac et 
al., 2017). Such perceptions show that the public is unconvinced by the media’s capacity to 
break free from the negative practices which, for long, have been governing the mass media 
in Serbia. As Pjesivac, Spasovska and Imre (2016) noted, Serbian citizens express a lack of faith 
in the expertise of Serbian journalists and a high degree of cynicism. 
2.2. Defining media trust 
The research on media trust has gained significant traction in recent years, but some 
concerns have been raised about the way the concept has been used in previous studies. It is 
frequently noted that a widely agreed-upon definition of media trust does not exist. Some 
have questioned its distinctiveness from media credibility which has a long research history 
in communication studies (see McLeod et al., 2017). Whereas the research on credibility has 
primarily investigated how properties of either the source, message, or media channel 
influence the course of communication, media trust is a relational concept focusing on the 
audiences’ attitudes regarding the news media (Kohring & Matthes, 2007). The concept of 
media trust has been strongly influenced by sociological approaches to studying trust and the 
notion of institutional trust (e.g., Luhmann, 1979; Mishler & Rose, 2001). In line with this 
tradition, Hanitzsch et al. (2018) have recently defined it as “the willingness of the audience to be 
vulnerable to news content based on the expectation that the media will perform in a satisfactory 
manner” (p. 5, emphasis in the original). 
However, it is becoming increasingly more challenging to define the news media–and 
designate the target of media trust by extension–in continually evolving media environments. 
In this study, we analyzed trust in news media with respect to different targets of trust. Our 
primary interest was to tap into the Serbian citizens’ attitudes toward news media in general. 
This approach is informed by how citizens conceptualize the news media as a social 
institution, in regard to considerations of professional journalism overall, rather than any 
particular news outlet (Hanitzsch et al., 2018; Ladd, 2012). In addition, following the previous 
studies which discovered that citizens’ trust varies depending on the different types of news 
outlets within a media system, we have also explored public trust in specific types of news 
outlets: public broadcasters and online-only media (Daniller, Allen, Tallevi & Mutz, 2017; 
Fawzi, 2019). Making this distinction is relevant for examining the association of populist 
attitudes and media trust, which will be further explained in the following section. 
Trust is also domain specific. The domain of trust refers to the scope of a trustee’s actions 
to which a trustor’s willingness to accept vulnerability is limited (PytlikZillig & Kimbrough, 
2016). Since the news making process consists of various activities (e.g., selecting stories, 
 
2 For details see https://freedomhouse.org/country/serbia/nations-transit/2020. 
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researching, observing, interviewing sources, and fact-checking), it makes sense to consider 
media trust a multidimensional construct. However, large-scale public opinion polls, such as 
the World Values Survey (WVS), commonly use single indicators to estimate public trust in 
news media (Daniller et al., 2017). The same approach has been adopted by the majority of 
academic research in the field (Ariely, 2015; Tsfati & Ariely, 2014; Tsfati & Cappella, 2003). 
Kohring and Matthes (2007) have criticized this approach for not reflecting the multifaceted 
nature of journalistic work, which was made central to their conceptualization and 
measurement of trust in news media. Building on journalism theories, they conceptualized 
trust in news media as a complex construct comprising four dimensions: trust in the 
selectivity of topics, selectivity of facts, accuracy of depictions, and journalistic assessments. 
At the center of their theory of trust in news media is selectivity, the fundamental feature of 
basic tasks regularly performed by media workers during the news production process. 
Previous research has found media trust in terms of journalistic selectivity to be relevant for 
Serbian citizens’ conceptualizations of media trust (Pjesivac et al., 2016), and the same 
conceptualization is also implemented in the current study. 
2.3. Origins of media trust 
Previous studies have explored a variety of the audience and media characteristics as 
potential origins of media trust. For instance, micro-level cultural theories posit that trusting 
attitudes are a product of individual socialization experiences (Mishler & Rose, 2001). Thus, 
cultural theories typically explain the level of media trust as a function of generalized trust 
and demographic factors (Pjesivac, 2017; Tsfati & Ariely, 2014). In addition, studies have found 
that a variety of other characteristics related to the audience–most notably, political 
attitudes–can also account for the differences in media trust (Hanitzsch et al., 2018; Tsfati & 
Ariely, 2014). In contrast, performance theories link trust more directly to the perceived 
and/or actual characteristics of the conduct of institutions (Mishler & Rose, 2001). In 
accordance with this argument, communication scholars have discussed flawed journalistic 
practices, such as sensationalism and focus on political strategies rather than policies, as 
potential reasons for weakening public trust in news media (Hopmann et al., 2015; Ladd, 2012). 
Due to the specifics of press-state relations in Serbia, we expected media trust to be 
particularly sensitive to the factors related to the media’s positioning relative to the citizens 
and political power and media’s adherence to citizens-oriented normative functions. Thus, 
our analysis focuses on populist attitudes and perceptions of journalistic role performance, 
as the individual-level cultural-political and performance factors which are consistent with 
our expectations. 
2.3.1. Populist attitudes and media trust 
When ‘populism’ was named the Cambridge Dictionary’s Word of the Year for 2017, it echoed 
a widely shared sentiment that we are living in a “populist Zeitgeist” (Mudde, 2004). What 
directed much attention toward populism in recent years was the occurrence of political 
events which threatened to challenge established political courses of Western democracies, 
such as the Brexit vote in the UK and the election of Donald Trump in the US (Flew, 2019). 
Populist parties have also been successful in more recently democratized nations, such as 
Hungary, Poland, and Serbia. According to Mudde (2000), various forms of populism (i.e., 
agrarian, economic, and political) have long been important features of political cultures in 
Eastern Europe. An example of the enduring relevance of the populist heritage can be 
observed in the party dynamics in Serbia, as political parties and movements across the 
ideological spectrum increasingly incorporate populist ideas into their programs and rhetoric 
(Stojiljković & Spasojević, 2018). 
The term ‘populist’ has been used as an umbrella term that denotes different types of 
political ideologies and parties (Akkerman, Mudde & Zaslove, 2014). In this study, we focused 
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on populist attitudes as a set of beliefs that citizens hold about the nature of people and 
society. Recent research has acknowledged that the success of populist projects rests in part 
on tapping into such ideas, often referred to as the demand side of populism, populist 
attitudes, or populist worldview (Akkerman et al., 2014; Spruyt, Keppens & Droogenbroeck, 
2016). At the core of populist attitudes lies a combination of people-centrism and anti-
establishment. In this view, society is perceived to be in a state of a perpetual conflict between 
the pure people and the corrupt elite (Mudde, 2004). People are considered a homogenous 
and virtuous group with unrestricted sovereignty whose interests have been under the attack 
from the corrupt elite. This is a minimal definition of populist attitudes, which applies 
indiscriminately to the citizens who ascribe to a populist worldview either on the left or right 
side of a political spectrum (Akkerman et al., 2014; Spruyt et al., 2016). 
Populist citizens can be particularly susceptible to populist leaders’ messages (Akkerman 
et al., 2014). The media have often been at the receiving end of hostile, anti-elite rhetoric of 
populist leaders (Flew, 2019). Populist criticisms are so powerful because the criticisms are 
directed not so much at the media’s professional abilities but at their integrity and 
benevolence. According to Freedom House (2016), this kind of rhetoric is not unfamiliar to 
President Vučić, who portrays investigative and independent media as “foreign-backed 
propagandists seeking to damage the government and destabilize Serbia” (para. 2). The 
message that this kind of rhetoric implies is not that the media just got some facts wrong, but 
that they are ultimately dangerous to the people. To those susceptible to the populist rhetoric, 
populist criticisms can become an important cue for media trustworthiness (Müller, 2013). 
More importantly, the relevance of populist attitudes for media trust comes from 
perceived positioning of the media on the populist dichotomy that puts people against the 
elite. Hanitzsch and his colleagues (2018) speculated that the wide-spread anti-establishment 
sentiment could be fueling both media and political distrust. Flew (2019) has also argued that 
“[a]nti-elitism extends to journalists and news organizations as much as it does to political 
and business elites” (p. 1). Some empirical support already exists for this idea. Mitchell and 
colleagues (2018) showed that, in eight West European countries, citizens who adopt populist 
views indeed expressed significantly lower trust in news media compared to those who reject 
them. Further, Fawzi (2019) has found the anti-elitism dimension of populist attitudes to be a 
negative predictor of trust in both quality and tabloid media in Germany. As noted above, the 
Serbian media have been considered a part of the state apparatus during the non-democratic 
regimes and continued to struggle with establishing independence after the democratic 
transition had started (Pjesivac & Imre, 2019; Rupar et al., 2019). For this reason, many citizens 
might still consider the media a part of the corrupt establishment which is working against 
the true interest of the people. 
 
H1a: Populist attitudes will be negatively associated with trust in news media in 
general among Serbian citizens. 
For general public and populist citizens alike, trust in specific outlets within a media 
system can vary, depending on the types of news outlets (Hopmann et al., 2015; Fawzi, 2019). 
We have argued that populist attitudes decrease media trust in Serbia largely because the 
media are still likely to be perceived as a part of the corrupt establishment. However, the 
degree to which specific types of outlets will be vulnerable to this kind of hostile perception 
could vary. For instance, Serbia’s oldest and most-watched television channel is the public 
broadcaster, Radio-Television of Serbia (RTS). It was a state-run national television station 
during the communist and authoritarian regimes, which began the transformation into a 
public service broadcaster after the regime change in 2000 (Radovic & Luther, 2012). Due to 
its longevity and persistently dominant position among Serbian viewers, we expected the 
public broadcaster to represent the most institutionalized type of news media. In contrast, 
online-only news outlets are regarded as one of the alternatives to the legacy news media 
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(Ladd, 2012; Lin & Chiang, 2017), and their work is often considered to recontextualize 
traditional journalism practices, if not entirely disregarding them in favor of a new, distinct 
set of rules (Mitchelstein & Boczkowski, 2009). 
Although popular online news sources in Serbia are predominately online editions of the 
established news media (Schlosberg, 2014), several online-only news outlets have also become 
successful over the past decade. For instance, digital-born Telegraf.rs and Espreso.rs, two 
among the most popular online news sources (IREX, 2019) were founded in 2012 and 2015, 
respectively. Similarly, Krik.rs, one of the influential investigative online-only outlets was also 
established in 2015. We assumed that online-only news outlets do not share the same negative 
heritage from non-democratic regimes, unlike the public broadcasters, because online media 
entered the Serbian media market considerably later. This could be reflected in the public’s 
perceptions of these two types of news outlets (e.g., the degree to which they are considered 
to represent the establishment), as suggested in the following hypothesis: 
 
H1b: Depending on the type of news channels, the relationship between populist 
attitudes and media trust will appear different; the relationship will be more 
negative for public broadcasting media than for online-only news. 
2.3.2. Perceptions of journalistic role performance and media trust 
Previous studies, which examined media trust as a function of media performance, have 
focused mostly on flawed journalistic practices and other deviations from the public’s 
normative expectations in democratic societies. For instance, scholars have argued that 
excessive cynicism, focus on conflicts and competitions instead of policies, sensationalism, 
and political bias in reporting can influence public skepticism toward the news media 
(Hopmann et al., 2015; Kovach & Rosenstiel, 2014; Ladd, 2012). The problem with this approach 
is that it focuses on specific instances of transgressions in media work, instead of addressing 
media performance in a more comprehensive manner. Citizens expect the media to perform 
a number of important functions (Willnat, Weaver & Wilhoit, 2019). Just as institutional factors 
of political trust are defined in relation to the main benefits that political systems are 
supposed to deliver –political and economic prosperity–, it would be helpful to examine the 
performance factors of media trust in terms of various benefits citizens expect the media to 
deliver. We argue that the most straightforward approach to do this is found by addressing 
journalistic roles in democratic societies, as the roles highlight the social functions and 
position of journalism (Hanitzsch & Vos, 2018), and thus clearly express citizens’ expectations 
of news media. Communication scholars have identified myriad specific journalistic roles (see 
Hanitzsch, 2018). A well-known classification encompasses the following four: the 
disseminator, interpretive, mobilizing, and adversarial roles (Chung & Nah, 2013; Weaver & 
Wilhoit, 1996; Willnat et al., 2019). 
The disseminator role describes the most basic democratic task of the news media–to 
provide relevant political information to citizens in order to assist them in making informed 
decisions in a neutral and objective manner. Recent studies have found a preference for 
objective journalism among the general public and journalism students in Serbia (Pjesivac et 
al., 2016; Pjesivac & Imre, 2019). The association of this kind of reporting with media trust 
(worthiness) has been shown by studies in different political contexts (Cozzens & Contractor, 
1987; Livio & Cohen, 2018). 
The interpretive or investigative role corresponds to the “watchdog” position of news 
media, which may serve as an external control mechanism that monitors those in power. The 
importance of this aspect of journalism was found to be relatively salient among the Serbian 
journalism students (Pjesivac & Imre, 2019), which might be indicative of the general public’s 
attitudes as well. However, previous research does not offer clear evidence for the association 
of this role with media trust. A recent study found that Korean citizens rated citizen-run 
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podcasts higher at performing the interpretative role and trust them more than other types 
of media. The same study found a different dynamic in the US, where podcasts were also rated 
higher at performing the interpretive role but were not trusted more than other types of 
outlets (Park, 2017). 
The mobilizing role emphasizes the importance of facilitating discussions and 
participation by providing a public forum in which diverse opinions may be represented and 
exchanged. This role might be particularly important in the Serbian context in which official 
news stories have long been dominating the media agenda (Radovic & Luther, 2012). As 
previous research has shown, providing a public forum is positively related to media trust, 
while feeling underrepresented increases dissatisfaction with the news media (Peifer, 2018; 
Austin & Pinkleton, 1999). 
Finally, the adversarial role positions the media against institutional centers of power 
with the potential to set the political agenda rather than to merely follow it (Hanitzsch & Vos, 
2018). Again, this role may be particularly important to Serbian citizens who perceive the 
media’s independence to be seriously weakened. A research set in transitioning Taiwan has 
found that the more citizens perceived the media and government to be in an adversarial 
relationship, the more they trusted the media (Gunther, Hong & Rodríguez, 1994). However, 
more recent research has shown that exposure to a combative talk-show host, representative 
of adversarial journalism, decreases media trust (Vraga et al., 2012). The authors explained this 
finding by arguing that too much emphasis on the adversarial role could signal a lack of media 
accountability, rather than independence, to the audience. 
In summary, there are indications that Serbian citizens value the normative journalistic 
roles examined above. There is also some evidence to suggest the association between the 
quality of journalistic role performance and media trust in various political contexts. 
However, the relationship between the public’s perceptions of journalistic role performance 
and media trust has rarely been examined in the context of young democracies. Also, studies 
have rarely examined the impact of different aspects of media performance on media trust 
simultaneously. This leads us to formulate the following research question: 
 
RQ1: How do perceptions of journalistic role performance relate to media trust 
among Serbian citizens? 
3. Methods 
Data for this study were collected through a non-probability web-based survey from May 30 
to June 6, 2018. The survey was conducted in collaboration with Plum Mark, a research agency 
which manages an online panel representing the Internet population in Serbia. Panel 
participants received an email invitation containing the survey URL, and the final sample 
included a total of 200 adult citizens. As an incentive for participating in the survey, 
respondents received approximately 1.2 EUR. We set a quota for gender according to the 
general Serbian population characteristic so that women accounted for 51% of the sample. The 
age distribution of the respondents was as follows: those aged 18-29 (27.5%), 30-39 (31.5%), 40-
49 (33.0%), 50-59 (6.0%), and those over 60 (2.0%). 
Considering the place of residence, 53% of respondents reported living in urban areas, 
35% in suburbs, and 12% in rural communities. Respondents who have completed high school 
comprised 47% of the sample, while the rest have obtained at least a two-year college diploma 
or higher level of tertiary education. Although representative in terms of gender, this sample 
was more urban, younger, and better educated compared to the Serbian Census data. 
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3.1. Measures 
3.1.1. Media trust 
Trust in news media in general was measured using Kohring and Matthes’ (2007) scale, as the 
second-order latent factor consisting of the four lower-level components. The respondents 
were asked to what extent they agree or disagree (from 1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly 
agree) to a total of 16 statements that are displayed in Table 1, along with factor loadings and 
reliability scores. The examination of fit indices based on the confirmatory factor analysis 
showed an acceptable model fit (CMIN/df = 2.049, CFI = .938, TLI = .925, RMR = .055, RMSEA 
= .073), and the values for the main dependent variable in this study were computed as 
second-order factor scores ranging from 0.86 to 4.31 (M = 2.42, SD = .67). 
 
Table 1: Items, factor loadings, and reliability scores for the scale measuring trust in 









Topics relevant for Serbian society 
receive the necessary attention. 
.690 




Topics covered in the news are assigned 
an adequate status. 
.631 
The frequency with which important 
topics are covered is adequate. 
.823 
The important topics are covered on the 
necessary regular basis. 
.903 
The essential points of the covered topics 
are included. 
.711 




The focus in news stories is on important 
facts. 
.844 
All important information is provided. .757 
Reporting includes different points of 
view. 
.696 
The information in reports would be 
verifiable if examined. 
.370 
Trust in the 
accuracy of 
depictions 
.836 .71 The reported information is true. .733 
The reports recount the facts truthfully. .752 
The facts I receive are correct. .669 







The journalists’ opinions are well-
founded. 
.811 
The commentary consists of well-
reflected conclusions. 
.778 
The journalists’ assessments are useful. .675 
Source: Own elaboration. Note. Items were modified from Kohring and Matthes (2007) 
to assess Serbian citizens’ perceptions on the reporting of news media in general, not 
limited to reporting on any particular topic 
Media trust according to the outlet was measured using a comprehensive single indicator 
asking respondents to report how much they trust the news programs of several media outlets 
(from 1 = not at all to 4 = very much). This approach was adopted following the commonly used 
measure of trust in WVS (e.g., Hanitzsch et al., 2018). Trust in public broadcasters (M = 2.44, 
SD = .74, Cronbach’s α = .79) was calculated by averaging the scores for national (RTS) and 
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regional (Radio-Television of Vojvodina) public broadcasters. Trust in online news outlets (M 
= 2.06, SD = .67, Cronbach’s α = .79) was calculated by averaging the scores for four online-
only outlets: Telegraf.rs, Espreso.rs, Krik.rs, and Pescanik.net. The outlets selected in this study 
are similar in that they are widely recognizable and provide news contents exclusively online, 
but they differ in terms of their editorial policies and journalistic styles. The former two are 
the two most popular online-only news outlets (IREX, 2019) and offer a combination of news 
and entertaining contents. However, since the former two outlets are considered to have a 
pro-government slant, the latter two outlets–distinct for their independence and critical 
reporting–were included; Krik.rs practices investigative reporting, while Pescanik.rs focuses 
on analyses and opinions. 
3.1.2. Populist attitudes 
Populist attitudes (M = 4.09, SD = 0.68, Cronbach’s α = .87) were measured as a coherent set 
of ideas–such as anti-elitism, the preference for popular sovereignty, and the belief in conflict 
of good and bad social forces–shared among populists, regardless of ideological direction 
(Akkerman et al., 2014; Spruyt et al., 2016). The index used for this purpose is composed of 
eight items (Spruyt et al., 2016), asking respondents to report the extent to which they agree 
(from 1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree) with the statements such as “The people, and 
not politicians, should make our most important policy decisions” and “The established elite 
and politicians have often betrayed the people.” 
3.1.3. Public perceptions of journalistic role performance 
We used a set of 15 indicators developed to assess distinct types of journalistic roles in 
democratic societies (Weaver & Wilhoit, 1996; Willnat et al., 2019). However, while previous 
studies examined the respondents’ assessments of the importance of each journalistic 
function, the current study examined respondents’ perspectives on how often Serbian media 
in general effectively fulfill each journalistic function (from 1 = never to 5 = always). The 
disseminator role (M = 3.51, SD = 0.68, Cronbach’s α = .51) was measured with four items such 
as “Getting information to the public quickly.” The interpretive journalistic role (M = 3.11, SD 
= 0.67, Cronbach’s α = .64) was assessed with four items including “Providing analysis and 
interpretation for complex problems.” The measurement for the mobilizing role (M = 2.38, SD 
= 0.82, Cronbach’s α = .87) also included four items, such as “Giving ordinary people a chance 
to express their views on public affairs.” Lastly, the adversarial role (M = 2.67, SD = 0.80, 
Cronbach’s α = .76) was measured with three items including “Being an adversary of public 
officials by being constantly skeptical of their actions.” 
According to the results of principal component analysis, however, the items by which 
perceptions of journalistic role performance were measured are not as clearly influenced by 
four different factors as previously theorized. More specifically, the indicators of the 
mobilizing and adversarial roles cluster fairly well, while only some items measuring the 
disseminator and interpretive roles cluster as predicted. Interestingly, this is a similar result 
to the one obtained in a recent study by Willnat et al. (2019), who used the same measurement 
tool to estimate the perceived importance of the core journalistic roles among media workers 
and the general public in the US. While for the journalists, all items clustered around four 
groups as predicted, these authors found that fewer items than expected formed perceptions 
of the disseminator and mobilizing roles for the citizens. Nevertheless, the current study used 
all items to calculate the scores for perceptions of journalistic role performance because their 
theoretical merits have been supported in previous research (Willnat & Weaver, 2018; Willnat 
et al., 2019). 
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3.1.4. Control variables 
Previous literature indicates several additional possible sources of trust in news media. In 
addition to the main independent variables, the questionnaire also included the items to 
measure several control variables, such as generalized trust, traditional and internet news 
media exposure, political interest, ideological stances, ideological extremity, political trust, 
and demographics. 
4. Results 
The results initially indicate that Serbian citizens expressed fairly low levels of trust in the 
news media, political institutions, and their fellow citizens. Individually, the most trusted 
news source appears to be the national public broadcaster RTS (M = 2.50, SD = 0.83). On the 
other hand, trust in exclusively online news outlets, such as Espresso.rs (M = 1.99, SD = 0.84) 
and Telegraf.rs (M = 1.86, SD = 0.80), which entered the Serbian media market relatively 
recently, was the lowest among the measured news media. Measurements of political trust 
demonstrated that Serbian citizens have a very low level of trust in their political institutions. 
Among them, political parties were rated as the most distrusted (M = 1.55, SD = 0.64), while 
the president emerged as the least distrusted institution (M = 1.98, SD = 1.02). 
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Table 2: Correlations among media trust and all predictors included in regression model, except for demographics. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1 Media trust              
2 Generalized trust -.03             
3 Traditional news 
consumption 
.18* -.02           
 
4 Online news 
consumption 
.13 .10 .66**          
 
5 Political interest  .12 .06 .47** .39**          
6 Conservatism .04 -.04 .10 .04 -.09         
7 Ideological extremity .11 -.07 .13 .18* .19** -.06        
8 Political trust .56** .12 .16* .14* .15* -.00 -.05       
9 Populist attitudes -.21** .00 -.02 -.02 -.08 .26** .05 -.41**      
10 Disseminator role .42** .05 .19** .12 .12 -.04 .03 .43** -.21**     
11 Interpretive role .59** -.04 .16* .11 .06 .11 .01 .49** -.12 .50**    
12 Mobilizing role  .55** .12 .13 .13 .13 -.06 .02 .43** -.21** .40** .61**   
13 Adversarial role .45** .08 .03 -.01 .02 .06 .00 .37** -.10 .34** .59** .62**  
Source: Own elaboration. *p ≤ 0.05 **p ≤ 0.01 (two-tailed). 
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Table 3: OLS models predicting trust in news media in general, public broadcasters, 
and online media. 
 
Trust in news media 
in general 
Trust in public 
broadcasters 


















































































































Total R2 (%) 53.8 19.7 19.3 
Adjusted R2 (%) 50.1 (N = 200) 13.1 (N = 200) 12.7 (N = 200) 
Source: Own elaboration. Note. Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients 
with standard errors in parentheses. All predictor variables except for Female, Age, and 
Education were mean-centered. ^p ≤ 0.1 *p ≤ 0.05 **p ≤ 0.01 ***p ≤ 0.001. 
Three ordinary least squares (OLS) regression models were run to examine the extent to 
which the proposed independent variables explain variability in media trust beyond 
commonly argued sources of trust. All predictors entered in the model, except for age, gender, 
and education, were mean-centered and no multicollinearity problems were found. The 
summary of the test results is displayed in Table 3. 
H1a predicted that support for populism will be negatively related to the trust in news 
media in general. Examining the zero-order correlation (Table 2) between the two variables 
showed a weak negative association (r = -.21, p = .003). However, after controlling for other 
relevant factors in the OLS regression model, the association between support for populism 
and trust in news media stopped being statistically significant and even changed direction to 
exhibit a positive correlation (β = .013, n. s.). Hence, these results do not provide enough 
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evidence that populist attitudes negatively relate to trust in news media in the Serbian 
context, when other relevant factors are controlled for; H1a was not supported. Regarding the 
association of populist views with the two contrasting groups of news outlets (the focus of 
H1b), the findings show an interesting pattern. Support for populism was negatively related 
to trust in public broadcasters (β = -.117, n. s.) and positively related to trust in online news 
outlets (β = .117, n. s.). In both cases, the relationships did not exhibit statistical significance. 
However, additional analysis to contrast the two populism coefficients revealed that the 
difference was statistically significant. We used the general linear model (GLM) procedure, by 
which we can test the equality of OLS regression coefficients for different dependent variables 
regressed on the same predictor(s), and the contrast estimate was -.242 (SE = .098, p = .015). 
The results indicate that the effects of populist attitudes on media trust may differ depending 
on the types of news outlets. Support for populism has more negative effects on trust in public 
broadcasters than online news outlets. This lends at least partial support for H1b. 
RQ1 asked how perceptions of normative journalistic roles performance relate to media 
trust in the context of a young democracy. According to the results, the interpretive 
journalistic role emerged as the strongest performance factor of media trust (β = .248, p = 
.001), followed by the perceived performance of the mobilizing role (β = .230, p = .002). 
Perceptions of the disseminator role were associated with trust in news media at the 
marginally significant level (β = .106, p = .091), while no significant relationship was found 
between the perceived performance of the adversarial role and media trust. 
Among the control variables, political trust was found to be strongly related to trust in 
news media in general (β = .287, p < .001) and public broadcasters (β = .231, p = .011). 
Interestingly, in the case of trust in online news media, this association was negative but not 
statistically significant (β = -.027, n. s.). In addition, less educated respondents were found to 
be more trusting of news media as an institution (β = -.149, p = .009). Finally, generalized 
social trust was negatively associated with the level of media trust in general, although this 
relationship was only marginally significant (β = -.094, p = .080). 
5. Discussion 
The aim of this study was to examine the extent to which trust in news media can be explained 
as a function of populist attitudes and perceptions of journalistic role performance in the 
context of a young democracy like Serbia. Contrary to our theoretical expectations, populist 
views were not found to be related to the level of trust in news media once other relevant 
factors were taken into account. However, citizens with stronger populist attitudes were 
found to be more distrusting of public broadcasters compared to online-only news outlets. 
An examination of performance factors demonstrated that the more satisfied respondents 
became with the performance of the interpretive and mobilizing journalistic roles, the more 
trust they placed in Serbian news media. Further, media trust was positively related to 
perceptions of the disseminator role performance, but this association was only marginally 
significant. 
One potential reason why we were not able to identify a clear relationship between 
populist views and media trust could be contextual. Serbia is one of the countries with the 
strongest link between political and media trust (Ariely, 2015). Hanitzsch et al. (2018) describe 
the situation in which political and media trust are so closely intertwined as the nexus of 
institutional trust. In societies with a strong nexus of trust, public perceptions of the media 
and political institutions can easily become entangled in a downward spiral, which appears to 
be the case in Serbia. The authors have argued that the anti-elite sentiment, the core of the 
populist worldview, could be fueling this reinforcing spiral of institutional distrust. Although 
populist attitudes were not found to have a direct impact on media trust in this study, they 
may exert a negative but indirect impact on media trust by decreasing political trust in Serbia. 
In contrast, populist attitudes may be more directly consequential for media trust in countries 
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like Norway, Finland, Poland, or France, where the link between the political and media trust 
is relatively weaker (Ariely, 2015). Future research on populist attitudes and news trust should 
consider how closely intertwined the public’s perceptions of the media and other institutions 
are in a specific context. More research is also needed to explore the potential role of political 
trust in mediating the relationships between media trust and relevant predictors (Hanitzsch 
et al., 2018; Lee, 2010). 
In addition, we found that support for populism reflects more negatively on trust in 
public broadcasters than online news media. The finding signals that it may be beneficial to 
examine how populist attitudes relate to the patterns of trust within a media system. Even if 
receptiveness to populist views might not appear to be associated with evaluations of 
journalists and news media in general, it could change what the audiences perceive as “real” 
journalism. As Fawzi (2019) noted, populists express more affinity for tabloid outlets, because 
their emphasis on personalization, language of ordinary people, and negativity is a good 
match with the populist worldview. Similarly, populists might prefer the outlets which 
provide more opportunities for users’ contributions and engagement, as such outlets could 
be perceived to share people-centric values. Future research should further explore how 
populist attitudes relate to the perceptions of different types of news media and reporting 
styles, such as citizen-run outlets, local, and partisan media. 
Our findings suggest that certain aspects of media performance –such as providing 
political analysis, monitoring political power, and serving as a public forum– are particularly 
important as the sources of public trust in news media. This is in line with previous research 
finding that journalism students in Serbia place a high value on journalistic roles which 
embody these crucial democratic functions (Pjesivac & Imre, 2019). In comparison, 
perceptions of the disseminator role performance were found to be less predictive of media 
trust and only marginally significant. Theoretically, these findings point toward potential 
benefits of assessing institutional factors of media trust through the perceived performance 
of the media’s basic democratic functions. Overall, the perceived performance of journalistic 
roles can thus offer a comprehensive and straightforward set of micro-level indicators of 
media performance. These indicators refer to the extent to which the media are considered 
to be capable of and successful at delivering the democratic demands and expectations of 
their audiences. This allows us to evaluate the media performance in terms which matter to 
citizens and to examine how different aspects of journalism vary in their relevance to media 
trust. 
On a practical level, our findings imply that recovering the alarmingly high level of public 
distrust in the media in Serbia should start with improving relationships with audiences. The 
importance that respondents ascribed to the mobilizer role could be indicative of the need 
for further engagement with audiences using various tools, from simply increasing the 
amount of conversation to crowdsourcing (Fink, 2019) and relational journalism (Lewis, 2019). 
Since the Serbian media have historically been perceived to serve a particular interest, the 
media need to find a structural way to connect with audiences in all stages of the news 
production process. This could be a helpful strategy to demonstrate a radical turn in Serbian 
political communication from an elite-dominated autocratic model toward a more inclusive 
participatory model (see Christians, Glasser, McQuail, Nordenstreng & White, 2009). 
These efforts could end up in vain, however, if citizens continue to have deep concerns 
about the independence of the media. Independence is a crucial prerequisite for the media to 
gain authority when performing the interpretive role and holding elected officials 
accountable (Kovach & Rosenstiel, 2014). Our findings indicate that one of the strongest 
reasons for the widespread distrust in Serbian media might be a prevalent perception that 
the media lack the capacity to fulfill this important democratic function. Indeed, the 
institutional media are losing their monopoly on this function as the number of other 
agencies, such as NGOs and think tanks, continue to grow (Esser & Neuberger, 2019). Thus, to 
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convince the public of the media’s relevance and authority as the primary outlet for 
information and analysis, the media should promote the transparency of ownership and 
create sustainable financing models. 
The findings presented above should be interpreted with caution considering the 
limitations of the study. Above all, the sample of respondents was not obtained using any 
probability sampling technique, which certainly limits the extent to which the results can be 
generalized. In addition, the lack of divergent validity in measuring perceived journalistic role 
performance should be noted as another limitation. Although the suggested four dimensions 
were not clearly identified among the Serbian public, we still consider the framework 
theoretically relevant and meaningful for understanding journalism’s roles in a young 
democracy. However, to increase the usefulness of the construct, future research should 
reassess how appropriate indicators of normative journalistic roles are for the analysis of 
contemporary media environments. Finally, our findings do not enhance the understanding 
of the causal order in the associations we identified. Future studies should make use of 
longitudinal data or experimental design to provide more compelling evidence for causality. 
Despite these limitations, our study contributes to the current discussion of the public 
perceptions of the media by illustrating the relevance of political and performance factors for 
public trust in media in a new democracy. We have shown the importance of considering 
different types of news outlets when examining the impact of populist attitudes on media 
trust. Our findings also exemplify the importance of considering distinct aspects of media 
performance to assess media trust in recently democratized societies. 
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